In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024), the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a “simple injury” test for determining whether an adverse employment action occurred in a disparate treatment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.[i] Since then, courts have grappled with the scope of Muldrow’s holding. This article examines Muldrow’s impact beyond Title VII disparate treatment claims, using decisions from Ninth Circuit courts where possible. Also reviewed is its application to hostile work environment, constructive discharge, retaliation, and whistleblower claims. Finally, we examine Muldrow’s application to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.[ii] In Muldrow, a female police sergeant alleged sex discrimination against the City of St. Louis after she was transferred from a plainclothes specialized intelligence division to a uniformed position elsewhere within her police department, against the recommendation of her prior commander, because her new commander felt that a man was better suited for her position. Although she retained her rank and pay, her responsibilities, perquisites, and schedule were less desirable after her transfer. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city because Muldrow failed to show those changes caused her a “significant” employment disadvantage. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.[iii]

In vacating the judgment of the Eighth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VII simply requires plaintiffs to show that a discriminatory action brought about “some disadvantageous change”—a simple injury—in employment terms and conditions.[iv] “Terms and conditions” covers more than economic or tangible harm.[v] Thus, “[t]o make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a  plaintiff must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.”[vi] Plaintiffs “do[] not have to show . . . that the harm incurred was ‘significant.’ Or serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.”[vii]  

Prior to Muldrow, the Ninth Circuit defined adverse actions as those that “materially” affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.[viii] The Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits required plaintiffs to pass a similar significance test.[ix] However, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “materially adverse employment actions” was already broad, and it took “an expansive view of the type of actions that can be considered adverse employment actions.”[x] Examples included actions negatively affecting compensation, reducing monthly base pay, paying even a couple of days late, or issuing warning letters or negative reviews.[xi]

In Title VII disparate treatment discrimination cases, courts use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to determine if there is sufficient evidence to prove discrimination.[xii] This framework requires plaintiffs to show that they (1) belong to a protected class, (2) were performing according to their employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and that (4) similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action were present that give rise to an inference of discrimination.[xiii] When these conditions are met, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action. If the defendant meets this burden, the burden returns to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s reasons are a pretext for discrimination.[xiv]  

Before and after Muldrow, sufficiently adverse actions have included failure to hire for positions one is qualified for, discharge, demotion, adverse job assignments, official discipline, significant changes in compensation or benefits, denial of promotional opportunities, assigning more—or more burdensome—job responsibilities, derogatory comments, hostile and dismissive attitudes, and inappropriate and sexist comments.[xv]

The ADEA, ADA, and Pregnant Workers Fairness Act use Title VII’s language prohibiting discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of employment. Courts use the McDonnell Douglas framework to determine if there is sufficient evidence to prove discrimination under these additional anti-discrimination laws.[xvi] Likewise, race discrimination claims under § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act are examined under the McDonnell Douglas framework.[xvii]

Although Muldrow held that plaintiffs need not show that their injury satisfies a significance test, circuit courts post-Muldrow have “continued to find [that] trivial changes to a plaintiff’s conditions of employment are insufficient to establish a claim for discrimination.”[xviii] In Xu v. LightSmyth Technologies, for example, on remand from the Ninth Circuit the trial court found plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims and her Oregon state law whistleblower and retaliation claims only effected trivial changes to her conditions of employment, which did not support her discrimination claims.[xix] In Rios v. Centerra Grp. LLC, the First Circuit found that prohibiting the plaintiff from eating at his post and parking his car or changing his clothes in certain places, and failing to provide the plaintiff with pointers at an off-duty shooting range practice session did not cause “some harm.”[xx] And in Cordova v. Textron Aviation, Inc., a Tenth Circuit district court noted that Muldrow’s requirement of “some harm” excludes “mere inconvenience” or changes that “make[] an employee unhappy.”[xxi]

These latter cases suggest that trivial, minor, or merely inconvenient changes to employment conditions will continue to not suffice to establish discrimination claims, despite Muldrow’s simple injury test. Put differently, such minor changes may be deemed insignificant or not “simple injuries” at all.

Hostile Work Environment Claims.

To succeed in a hostile-work-environment claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must show (1) that they were subjected to a verbal or physical conduct because of their membership in a protected category, (2) that the conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of their employment and create an (objectively and subjectively) abusive working environment.[xxii] In Harris v. Forklift Systems, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when evaluating whether harassment is “severe or pervasive,” courts should look to the totality of the circumstances, including factors such as (1) the frequency of the conduct, (2) its severity, (3) whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance, and (4) whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.[xxiii]

Hostile work environment claims therefore require showing more than a simple injury. For example, in Harris the U.S. Supreme Court held that “‘mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee,’ does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII.”[xxiv] Although workplace harassment, if sufficiently severe or pervasive, may in and of itself constitute an adverse employment action, Ninth Circuit courts have declined to find a hostile work environment if allegations consist only of “harassment that is occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial,” i.e., if they are simple injuries. Similarly, in Williams v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, the Sixth Circuit, while evaluating adverse employment actions under Muldrow, did not employ Muldrow’s standard when evaluating a hostile work environment claim.[xxv]

Hostile work environment claims, requiring “severe or pervasive” conduct that objectively and subjectively creates an “abusive working environment,” therefore evoke more than a simple injury, and adverse employment actions under this rubric will likely require no less after Muldrow.

Constructive Discharge Claims Also Continue to Require More Than a Simple Injury

In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, the plaintiff brought a claim alleging both constructive discharge and hostile work environment claims.[xxvi] The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that claims for constructive discharge lie under Title VII, holding that in addition to a showing that “the offending behavior must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,” such claims require “something more,” to wit, that “[a] plaintiff . . . must show working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.”[xxvii] The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, and a Tenth Circuit court, have held that Muldrow did not alter the holding in Suders.[xxviii]

As with hostile work environment claims, after Muldrow viable constructive discharge claims thus continue to require more than a simple injury.

Muldrow Left the Standard in Retaliation Claims Intact

Title VII also prohibits retaliation for opposing unlawful practices, making a charge, and for testifying, assisting, or participating in investigations, proceedings, or hearings.[xxix] Retaliation claims are analyzed under the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis as discrimination claims.[xxx]

The term “adverse employment action,” however, is construed differently in retaliation than disparate treatment claims. In Muldrow, the Court explained that, unlike in discrimination claims, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision “applies only when the retaliatory action is ‘materially adverse,’ meaning that it causes ‘significant’ harm.”[xxxi] This test “was meant to capture those (and only those) employer actions serious enough to ‘dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”[xxxii]Consistent with White, the Ninth Circuit construes “adverse employment action” in retaliation cases to mean “adverse treatment that is reasonably likely to deter employees from protected activity.”[xxxiii]

Accordingly, the standard for retaliation claims remains unchanged after Muldrow.

Muldrow Has Been Extended to the ADA, ADEA, and Section 1981 Claims

As Extended to the ADA. The ADA provides that no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.[xxxiv] To “discriminate against” includes failing to make reasonable accommodations unless they would impose an undue hardship.[xxxv] There are two principal types of discrimination claims under the ADA—”disparate treatment” and “failure to accommodate.”[xxxvi] To qualify for relief under the ADA, an employee or applicant must establish that they are (1)  disabled, (2) qualified—with or without reasonable accommodation—to perform the essential functions of the job they hold or seek, and that (3) they suffered an adverse employment action because of disability.[xxxvii]

Courts interpret “adverse employment action” akin under the ADA and Title VII; as we have seen, prior to Muldrow several Circuit Courts required a “materially adverse” change in working conditions in order to find an adverse employment action.[xxxviii] But after Muldrow, the First, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits only require plaintiffs to show a simple injury.[xxxix]

Prior to Muldrow, the Ninth Circuit found that failures to, among other things, engage in the interactive process, or provide reasonable accommodations such as reassignment, leaves of absence or working from home, constituted adverse employment actions.[xl] It merits mentioning that a circuit split exists on whether a failure to engage in the interactive process constitutes a separate claim under the ADA. Most circuits, including the Ninth, hold that an employer has a mandatory obligation to engage in the interactive process, and that this obligation is triggered either by the employee’s request for accommodation or by the employer’s recognition of the need for accommodation.[xli] But other circuits, such as the First, Sixth, and Eleventh, require the employee to produce evidence that a reasonable accommodation is available before an employer is obligated to engage in the interactive process.[xlii]

A Ninth Circuit court has yet to decide whether a showing of simple injury suffices to establish an adverse employment action under the ADA—which is not surprising, since Muldrow was just issued in 2024. But since the Ninth Circuit construes adverse employment actions broadly and expansively, already applies Muldrow to Title VII claims, and subjects ADA and Title VII claims to the same analysis, it will likely apply Muldrow’s simple injury test to ADA claims.

Muldrow and the ADEA. Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of age over 40.[xliii] The McDonnell Douglas framework applies to actions under the ADEA.[xliv] Unlike in Title VII, an ADEA plaintiff must prove that age was the “but-for” cause of the employer’s adverse action.[xlv]

As with the ADA, after Muldrow several Circuit Courts—including the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh—apply the simple injury standard to ADEA claims.[xlvi] Somewhat of a Ninth Circuit outlier is Stepien v. Raimondo, where a district court stated that an “adverse employment action” is one “that materially affects” the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” but also mentioned Muldrow’s “some injury” standard in an adjacent parenthetical.[xlvii] For the reasons given above under the ADA, however, Stepien’s somewhat hybrid test is likely a one-off aberration, and the Ninth Circuit is apt to examine ADEA claims under Muldrow’s simple injury standard.  

Extending to Whistleblower Actions. Whistleblower claims involve reporting misconduct within an organization to authorities who can take corrective action, while retaliation claims pertain to the actions taken against the person reporting the misconduct. Although they may arise from the same course of conduct, they are separate claims, with the retaliation claim available under Title VII, the ADA, and ADEA, and the whistleblower claim often available under state whistleblower statutes.[xlviii] If an employee thus reports discriminatory practices—to the EEOC, for example—and her employer acts against her, she may have separate claims for whistleblowing and retaliation.[xlix] The elements in retaliation and whistleblower claims are identical, requiring the plaintiff to show that she (1) engaged in protected activity, (2) was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (3) that there was a causal link between the two; Muldrow’s simple injury test thus enters the picture because whistleblower claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework.[l] 

In Xu, for instance, the plaintiff’s claims included a whistleblower claim under an Oregon law modeled after Title VII, which was analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework.[li] Because the whistleblower statute in Xu covered conduct relating to the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” the Court found that “[t]he required showing of an adverse employment action tracks the [simple injury] standard of harm from Muldrow.”[lii]

Whistleblower claims rooted in the same course of conduct as claims under Title VII, the ADA and ADEA, evaluated as they are under the McDonnell Douglas framework, will likely be subject to Muldrow’s simple injury standard, albeit typically by state courts.

Section 1981 Extended. Under § 1981, “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to the full and equal benefits of all laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens[.]”[liii] The elements of a § 1981 and Title VII hostile work environment claims are identical, but the § 1981 claim must be based on race.[liv] The prima facie case under both claims is identical because the “legal principles guiding a court in Title VII dispute cases apply with equal force in a § 1981 action.”[lv] Thus, in Kitazi v. Sellen Construction Company, Inc., a Ninth Circuit court analyzed an employee’s Title VII and § 1981 race discrimination claims under the same McDonnell Douglas framework.[lvi] Further, a Second Circuit court found that Muldrow applied to § 1981 claims.[lvii] This suggests that Muldrow’s simple injury standard also applies to § 1981 claims.

Conclusion

Muldrow adopted a “simple injury” test for Title VII disparate treatment adverse employment action claims. Prior to Muldrow, the Ninth Circuit already interpreted the term “adverse employment action” broadly and expansively, and we can expect that post-Muldrow the Ninth Circuit will continue in that trajectory, liberally applying Muldrow’s test and expanding it, if it has not already, to other anti-discrimination statutes, such as the ADA, ADEA, PWFA, and § 1981 claims. On the other hand, given statements in Muldrow and prior precedents, the standard for hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation claims likely will remain the same.

A graduate of UC Berkeley and UCLA School of Law, Rafael A. Icaza is a Deputy Attorney General assigned to the Idaho Department of Labor and Idaho Human Rights Commission. In his free time, he enjoys competitive pistol shooting, reading, and attending Boise Phil and ballet performances. Rafael and his wife, Andrea, home schooled their two cats, Timothy and Clancy, recent graduates of the École D’Études Supérieures Pour la Chasse Auxs Petits Rongeurs (School of Superior Studies for the Hunt of the Little Rodents), in Paris, France. Joey, Rafael’s Betta fish, resides at his office and is a constant source of inspiration and emotional support. Mr. Icaza’s analysis and opinions in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Idaho Attorney General’s Office or his clients.

[i] 601 U.S. 346, 144 S.Ct. 967 (2024).

[ii] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

[iii] Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 350-51.

[iv] Id. at 354.

[v] Id.

[vi] Id.

[vii] Id.

[viii] Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9^th Cir. 2008).

[ix] Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 353 n. 1.

[x] Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz, 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9^th Cir. 2004) (broad); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9^th Cir. 2000) (expansive).

[xi] See Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 970 (9^th Cir. 2002) (reduction in base monthly pay); University of Hawai’i Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1105–06 (9^th Cir. 1999) (receiving pay even a couple of days late); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9^th Cir. 1987) (warning letter or negative review).

[xii] McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).

[xiii] Id. See also Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Products, 847 F.3d 678, 690-91 (9^th Cir. 2017) (restating elements of prima facie case).

[xiv] Reynaga, 847 F.3d at 691.

[xv] De Silva v. Pima County Government, 2024 WL 4751574, *6, 8 (D. Ariz. 2024) (failure to hire for positions one is qualified for, denial of promotional opportunities) (construing the Arizona Civil Rights Act, which is subject to the same analysis as Title VII claims); Schouker v. Swarm Industries, Inc., 2025 WL 1022141, *3-4 (N.D. Cal. 2025), citing Ayala v. Frito Lay, Inc., 263 F.Supp.3d 891, 905 (E.D. Cal. 2017); Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9^th Cir. 2008).

[xvi] 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (ADA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-1(5) (PWFA). ADEA: Avina v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 72 F.4^th 839 (8^th Cir. 2023), certiorari denied 144 S.Ct. 555; ADA: Bryant v. Better Business Bureau of Greater Maryland, Inc., 923 F.Supp. 720 (D. Md. 1996) (4^th Cir.). Regarding the PWFA, to date there are no reported cases setting forth the elements of a prima facie case.

[xvii] 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., Inc., 26 F.3d 1277 (5^th Cir. 1994), certiorari denied 513 U.S. 1149.

[xviii] Xu v. LightSmyth Technologies, Inc., 2025 WL 2770511, *5 (D. Or. 2025).

[xix] Id. at *5-9.

[xx] 106 F.4^th 101, 112-13 (1^st Cir. 2024).

[xxi] 2025 WL 1262487, at *7 (D. Kan. 2025) (citing Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 359).

[xxii] Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798, 800 n. 6.

[xxiii] Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).

[xxiv] Id. at 21, quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986).

[xxv] Schouker, 2025 WL 1022141, *4, *6; Williams, 2024 WL 3427171, at *5, 7-8 (6^th Cir. 2024). See also Zuniga v. City of Dallas, 2024 WL 2734956, at *3 n. 3 (N.D. Tex. 2024) (Muldrow does not alter the hostile work environment case); Navarro v. Hollywood Imports Limited, Inc., 2024 WL 5263832, *5 (S.D. Fla. 2024) (11^th Cir.) (“the . . . Plaintiff has not cited to, nor could the Court find, any authority indicating that Muldrow changed the standard for establishing a hostile work environment claim.”); Russell v. Wormuth, 756 F.Supp.3d 1162, 1181 n. 6 (D. Kan. 2024) (10^th Cir.) (hostile work environment claim requires tangible employment action or severe and pervasive conduct, and Muldrow did not change either analysis).

[xxvi] 542 U.S. 129, 143 (2004).

[xxvii] Id. at 133-34, 146-47. See also Fleming v. City of Boise, 2025 WL 2837734 (9^th Cir. 2025) (constructive discharge case under Idaho’s Protection of Public Employee’s Act, I.C. § 6-2105).

[xxviii] Fleming, 2025 Wl 2837734, at *1.

[xxix] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

[xxx] Windermere, 301 F.3d 958, 969 (9^th Cir. 2001).

[xxxi] 144 S.Ct. at 975 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).

[xxxii] Id.

[xxxiii] Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir. 2000).

[xxxiv] 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

[xxxv] Id. at (b)(5)(A).

[xxxvi] Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of Boundary Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 101, 666 F.3d 561, 567 (9^th Cir. 2011).

[xxxvii] Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9^th Cir. 1996).

[xxxviii] See, e.g., Haynes v. Level 3 Communications, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215 (10^th Cir. 2006), certiorari denied 549 U.S. 1252 (removing sales employee’s accounts constituted adverse employment action upon which Title VII, ADEA, and ADA claims could be based), abrogated 903 F.3d 900, (10^th Cir. 2018); Whitlow v. Visiting Nurse Ass’n of Western New York, 420 F.Supp.2d 92 (W.D. N.Y. 2005), affirmed 186 Fed.Appx. 36, 2006 WL 1585440 (requiring a “materially adverse” change in working conditions).

[xxxix] Rios v. Centerra Grp., LLC, 106 F4th 101, 112 n. 4 (1^st Cir. 2024); Scheer v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health System, Inc., 144 F.4^th 1212, 12114 (10^th Cir. 2025); Davis v. Orange Cnty., 2024 WL 3507722, at *3-4 (11^th Cir. 2024) (ADA claims).

[xl] Humphrey v. Memorial Hospital’s Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1135-36, 1137 (9^th Cir. 2001) (referencing leave of absence, reassignment to work from home, and breakdown of interactive process).

[xli] Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9^th Cir. 2000) (citing Eight, Third, Seventh, and Fifth cases), certiorari granted in part 532 U.S. 970, opinion after grant of certiorari 535 U.S. 391, on remand 297 F.3d 1106.

[xlii] Nicholson v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 783 F.Supp.3d 506, 523 (2025), citing Lang v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 813 F.3d 447, 456 (1^st Cir. 2016); Hrdlicka v. General Motors, 63 F.4^th 555, 572 (6^th Cir. 2023); Willis v. Conopco, 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11^th Cir. 1997).

[xliii] 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).

[xliv] Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599, 608 (9^th Cir. 2021).

[xlv] Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).

[xlvi] McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, Ohio, 117 F.4^th 887, 900 (6^th Cir. 2024); Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc., 142 F.4^th 460, 470 (7^th Cir. 2025); Yeates v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 115 F.4^th 414, 420 n. 4 (5^th Cir. 2024).

[xlvii] 2024 WL 4043589, at *13 (W.D. Wash. 2024).

[xlviii] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)-(b) (ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (ADEA); See, e.g., Collette v. St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hosp., 132 F.Supp.2d 256, 274 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (action under New York Whistleblower Act did not bar Title VII retaliatory termination action event though both actions arose from same course of conduct). (N.B., Idaho’s Protection of Public Employees Act, I.C. § 6-2105, provides a legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule, or regulation.)

[xlix] Rodrigue v. PTS Management Group, LLC, 550 F.Supp.3d 376, 399 (W.D. La. 2021) (outside sales consultant’s allegation that he filed an EEOC charge, which commenced EEOC proceeding, was sufficient to allege a protected action, as required to state a claim under Title VII’s retaliation provision, and Louisiana’s whistleblower’s statute).

[l] Xu, 2025 WL 2770511 at *9 (D. Or. 2025), citing Pool v. VanRheen, 297 F.3d 899, 910 (9^th Cir. 2002) (“The required showing on an adverse employment action tracks the standard of harm from Muldrow”); Schouker, 2025 WL 1022141, at *11 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (whistleblower claim under Cal. Lab. C. § 1102.5(b) and retaliation claim under FEHA, modeled after Title VII, share identical elements).

[li] Id.

[lii] Id.

[liii] 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).

[liv] Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9^th Cir. 2003), citing Runyon v. McRary, 427 U.S. 160, 168.

[lv] 339 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 756 F.Supp. 1547 (M.D. Ga. 1991), affirmed 959 F.2d 1566 (generally legal elements of § 1981 employment discrimination claim are identical to those of Title VII disparate treatment claim).

[lvi] 2017 WL 5455372, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 2017).

[lvii] Anderson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2024 WL 2801986, at *10 (S.D. N.Y. 2024) (“So the only question after Muldrow . . . is whether § 1981 differs from Title VII in some way that justifies a continued materiality rule. It does not.).