The Uses and Limits of a Motion for Reconsideration in Idaho by Stephen L. Adams and W. Christopher Pooser

January 8, 2024 by Carissa Carns

Man with gavel and page.

by Stephen L. Adams and W. Christopher Pooser

A motion for reconsideration is a standard motion in civil practice, and most times such motions are addressed pro forma. However, such motions can be misused, and the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated misuse can result in sanctions against the attorney. These motions deserve more thought than they are often given.

A motion for reconsideration is not simply a vehicle to challenge a ruling that a party does not like. There are minimum requirements imposed on a party seeking reconsideration. This article addresses the scope of motions for reconsideration in Idaho, as well as the limits on such motions.

Authority For and the Purpose of Motions for Reconsideration

Let’s begin by comparing the motions with their federal counterpart. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2(b)(1), “A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final judgment may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a final judgment.”[i] This rule does not say anything about the scope of a motion for reconsideration, only the timing. However, it presupposes that motions for reconsideration are allowed under Idaho law. In fact, trial courts have no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for reconsideration. They must.[ii]

In those ways, motions for reconsideration in Idaho are substantially different from motions for reconsideration under federal law. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no rule specifically allowing for reconsideration. That being said, federal courts indicate that motions for reconsideration are generally permitted and have cited F.R.C.P. 59 and 60 as bases of authority for such motions.[iii] In addition, federal courts often cite to their inherent authority to reconsider interlocutory rulings, despite the lack of specific authority.[iv]

The difference in authority leads to entirely different purposes for a motion for reconsideration in Idaho state courts and federal courts. In Idaho state courts, motions for reconsideration have long been utilized as a method to present new evidence.[v] “A rehearing or reconsideration in the trial court usually involves new or additional facts, and a more comprehensive presentation of both law and fact. Indeed, the chief virtue of a reconsideration is to obtain a full and complete presentation of all available facts, so that the truth may be ascertained, and justice done, as nearly as may be.”[vi]

At the same time, “a motion for reconsideration need not be supported by any new evidence or authority.”[vii] “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to reexamine of the correctness [sic] of an order.”[viii] Thus, a motion for reconsideration can be used to present new facts, or simply can be used to argue that the law was applied incorrectly. As discussed in the following, though, there are limitations on these purposes.

In contrast, motions for reconsideration in federal courts are much more limited in scope. “[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.”[ix] Ninth Circuit caselaw also suggests that motions for consideration may be appropriate if the initial decision was manifestly unjust.[x]

Despite the limited scope of motions for reconsideration, Idaho’s federal courts have noted, “Ultimately, it is the court’s duty to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. In certain circumstances, this may mean that a court must reconsider, modify, or even reverse a prior determination.”[xi]

With that background in mind, from here on out, this article focuses on motions for reconsideration in Idaho state courts. It is worth noting that, like the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure also allow for motions for reconsideration.[xii] There is no directly comparable rule in criminal law.[xiii]

Standards of Review

As noted previously, Idaho’s rules on reconsideration set time limits for motions for reconsideration, allowing such motions to be filed up to 14 days after entry of judgment, or 14 days after any order issued after entry of judgment.[xiv] There are numerous orders, though, for which no reconsideration is permitted.[xv]

Caselaw discussing the applicable standard of review for a motion for reconsideration is somewhat contradictory. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated, “A decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B)[xvi] is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”[xvii] Under this language, arguably the applicable standard is based on the Lunneborg discretionary standard.[xviii] But the Supreme Court has also stated, “When a district court decides a motion to reconsider, the district court must apply the same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered.”[xix] Under this caselaw, the applicable standard is whatever standard applied to the original motion, whether it be a question of law, a discretionary standard, etc.

The Idaho Supreme Court has not specifically resolved this dichotomy. Take for example Elsaesser v. Riverside Farms, Inc.[xx] There the Supreme Court states that the standard of review is the same as the standard on the original motion. Later, the Supreme Court states that the denial of reconsideration is subject to an abuse of discretion standard and then finds that the appellant did not address any of the Lunneborg factors.

Under such circumstances, it is difficult to determine which standard applies before the district court. Recent case law suggests a mixed bag as to which standard applies to motions for reconsideration.[xxi] Though there is no clear answer, perhaps the ideal approach is to argue the applicable standard for the underlying motion before the district court, and on appeal, be prepared to argue both the standard of the original motion and address the Lunneborg elements to the extent possible.

When a Motion for Reconsideration Is Something Else

Occasionally, in Idaho, motions for reconsideration are treated as something else. This is particularly true when a judgment has been entered. In Dunlap v. Cassia Mem’l Hosp. Med. Ctr., the Idaho Supreme Court noted that reconsideration of a partial summary judgment motion filed after a Rule 54(b) certificate was issued was not valid under (then) I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B), but was instead a motion to amend a judgment under I.R.C.P. 59(e).[xxii] The logic was that once judgment was entered, the partial summary judgment was no longer interlocutory, but was instead final, and therefore only the judgment could be amended.[xxiii]

Similar rulings have occurred in other cases. In Eby v. State, a dismissal under I.R.C.P. 40(c) was deemed a final decision, meaning that reconsideration was not permitted under I.R.C.P. 11.2.[xxiv] And in Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, the Idaho Supreme Court indicated the conditions under which successive motions for reconsideration are permitted before they become impermissible (which in the circumstances of that case, the first and second were permissible while the third was not).[xxv] Needless to say, courts have authority to treat mislabeled motions for reconsideration as the proper motion.[xxvi]

New Evidence and Timeliness: Which Wins?

Again, a motion for reconsideration may be utilized for the purpose of presenting new evidence to the trial court. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, “The trial court must consider new evidence that bears on the correctness of an interlocutory order if requested to do so by a timely motion under Rule 11(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.”[xxvii] But while couched in mandatory language, there are exceptions to this rule when the new evidence is not timely submitted.[xxviii]

Under several recent cases, the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected new evidence in a motion for reconsideration due to the evidence being inadmissible for some other reason. For example, in Ciccarello v. Davies, shortly after the plaintiff disclosed its experts, the defendants moved for summary judgment, which was granted in part because the plaintiff failed to submit a required declaration of an expert.[xxix] After oral arguments were made on the motions (but before the ruling was issued), the plaintiff submitted a declaration of an expert.[xxx] Despite this, the trial court granted summary judgment, not mentioning the late declaration.[xxxi] The plaintiff then moved for reconsideration, relying on the declaration as new evidence. The trial court declined to rely on this new evidence as it was untimely.[xxxii]

In upholding the grant of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that a trial court had discretion to disregard untimely declarations.[xxxiii] The Supreme Court explicitly addressed the issue of new evidence on reconsideration, stating, “While this Court has explained that when considering a motion for reconsideration the trial court should take into account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the order, this rule was not designed to allow parties to bypass timing rules or fail to conduct due diligence prior to a court’s ruling.”[xxxiv]

Similarly, in Summerfield v. St. Luke’s McCall, Ltd., the Supreme Court stated, “The trial court should have the discretion to determine whether it will consider additional evidence in support of a motion for reconsideration, if it is submitted late. Without such discretion, parties can bypass timing rules or fail to conduct due diligence prior to a court’s ruling because the trial court must consider any additional evidence.”[xxxv] To emphasize this point, the Supreme Court stated, “In short, while a motion for reconsideration is a safety valve to protect against legal and factual errors, it is not intended to be a mechanism that encourages tactical brinkmanship or a lack of diligence.”[xxxvi]

The takeaway from Ciccarello and Summerfield should be that the requirement that a trial court “must” consider new evidence on reconsideration is subject to exceptions. When evidence is subject to a timing rule, such as an expert disclosure deadline or a declaration that needed to be attached to a responsive briefing under I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(B) or 56(b)(2), the evidence may be excluded on reconsideration in the trial court’s discretion. It makes sense that this rule does not apply to newly discovered evidence. Nevertheless, practitioners should not presume that they can solve all evidentiary errors or failures on reconsideration, because the discretion to disregard or allow untimely declarations is fairly broad.[xxxvii]

Reconsideration and Sanctions

The Idaho Supreme Court recently released a case showing how motions for reconsideration can be misused so substantially as to constitute sanctionable conduct. In BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Erstad Architects, PA, summary judgment was granted in 2019, but final judgment was not issued until two years later.[xxxviii] Fourteen days after the final judgment was granted, the plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment order, “based on new arguments and evidence.”[xxxix] The trial court dismissed the motion for reconsideration, finding it to be, “untimely, lacking in diligence, and improper,” and stating that the plaintiff, “did not challenge the correctness of the Order, but raise[d] new arguments based on law in existence when it originally opposed the [defendants’] summary judgment motion.”[xl]

On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and found the appellate briefing as to reconsideration warranted sanctions against the attorneys. The ruling seems strange at first blush. The timing limits in I.R.C.P. 11.2 were met – the motion for reconsideration was filed within 14 days after judgment was granted. Thus, the motion was not – per the rule – untimely. Further, new evidence and additional authority are the bread and butter of a motion for reconsideration, and both were provided to the trial court. So why was this motion for reconsideration unjustified?

The Supreme Court provided several explanations, most of which seem case specific. However, one takeaway is that “reconsideration serves as a judicial backstop granting the trial court another opportunity to make the right call; however, it does not provide appellants with a fourth strike on appeal.”[xli] What this language suggests is that a motion for reconsideration on the same issues, with the same new arguments and evidence, may have been appropriate if it had been filed shortly after the original ruling granting summary judgment.

Regardless, even though the motion for reconsideration was in line with I.R.C.P. 11.2, and the rule’s purpose, it appears the Supreme Court used its equitable powers to impose sanctions against the attorneys under a theory that approaches the concept of laches.[xlii] In other words, yes, a party technically has 14 days after entry of judgment to file for reconsideration, and yes, a party may always submit new evidence and new legal theories. However, any request for reconsideration that looks like an attempt to preserve a new issue for appeal long after the matter was resolved is not guaranteed the right to reconsideration. Thus, the notion that, “the district court has no discretion to decide whether to entertain a motion for reconsideration”[xliii] appears to have limits.

Conclusion

The purpose of a motion for reconsideration under Idaho law is to ensure the correctness of a ruling, either through the review of new evidence, or reexamination of the law. In utilizing a reconsideration motion, practitioners should be aware of the applicable standard of the underlying motion, and on appeal, also be ready to apply the Lunneborg abuse of discretion standards. Motions for reconsideration cannot always be used to get around timing deadlines – particularly those that go along with summary judgment briefing and expert disclosures – for the simple reason that trial courts have broad discretion in excluding untimely evidence. The Supreme Court has indicated that this discretion appears to trump the requirement to consider new evidence on reconsideration.

Practitioners should also be aware of attempting to misuse reconsideration – such as a belated effort to preserve an issue for appeal – as the courts clearly frown upon the practice. At a minimum, it is a waste of time, money, and judicial resources, and at worst, the behavior can result in sanctions. Therefore, practitioners should examine the motives behind a motion for reconsideration before it is filed to determine if it meets the requirements imposed by Idaho caselaw.

Adams, Stephen

Stephen L. Adams

Stephen L. Adams is Senior Counsel with Gjording Fouser in Boise. He is the Treasurer of the Idaho Association of Defense Counsel and is past president of the Idaho State Bar Appellate Practice Section. He used to have only four children but has fairly recently acquired two cat children and one dog child. He did not plan for this and is slowly accumulating enough pet fur to crochet another pet.

Pooser, Chris

W. Christopher Pooser

W. Christopher (Chris) Pooser is the Office Managing Partner at Stoel Rives’s Boise office, where he maintains an appellate practice. He is a member of the Idaho Association of Defense Counsel and is the co-founder and a past president of the Idaho State Bar Appellate Practice Section.

[i] I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(1).

[ii] Fisk v. McDonald, 167 Idaho 870, 892, 477 P.3d 924, 946 (2020).

[iii] See, e.g., Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993).

[iv] See, e.g. City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001).

[v] See, e.g., Prescott v. Prescott, 97 Idaho 257, 260, 542 P.2d 1176, 1179 (1975). See also Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 344, 179 P.3d 303, 307 (2008).

[vi] Coeur d’Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990).

[vii] Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).

[viii] Int’l Real Estate Solutions, Inc. v. Arave, 340 P.3d 465, 468 (2014).

[ix] Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000).

[x] Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

[xi] Hajro v. Sullivan, No. 1:21-CV-00468-DCN, 2022 WL 17362060, at *2 (D. Idaho Dec. 1, 2022) (cleaned up, quoting F.R.C.P. 1).

[xii] See I.R.F.L.P. 503(b).

[xiii] State v. Flores, 162 Idaho 298, 302, 396 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2017) (fn. 1). But see I.C.R. 35(b) (allowing for motions for reductions of sentences).

[xiv] I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(1).

[xv] I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(2).

[xvi] Now I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(1).

[xvii] Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 560, 212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009). See also Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 808, 291 P.3d 1000, 1007 (2012); Marek v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 50, 53, 278 P.3d 920, 923 (2012); Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen, 154 Idaho 549, 554, 300 P.3d 1037, 1042 (2012); Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 212, 177 P.3d 955, 959 (2008); Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001).

[xviii] Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

[xix] Int’l Real Est. Sols., Inc. v. Arave, 157 Idaho 816, 819, 340 P.3d 465, 468 (2014). See also Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Hymas, 157 Idaho 632, 339 P.3d 357, 362 (2014); Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012); Marek v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 50, 53, 278 P.3d 920, 923 (2012).

[xx] Elsaesser v. Riverside Farms, Inc., 170 Idaho 502, 513 P.3d 438 (2022).

[xxi] See, e.g. Fisk v. McDonald, 167 Idaho 870, 892, 477 P.3d 924, 946 (2020); Jackson v. Crow, 164 Idaho 806, 811, 436 P.3d 627, 632 (2019); Brunobuilt, Inc. v. Strata, Inc., 166 Idaho 208, 217, 457 P.3d 860, 869 (2020); Alsco, Inc. v. Fatty’s Bar, LLC, 166 Idaho 516, 524, 461 P.3d 798, 806 (2020).

[xxii] Dunlap v. Cassia Mem’l Hosp. Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 233, 235–36, 999 P.2d 888, 890–91 (2000).

[xxiii] Id. at 236, 999 P.2d at 891. See also Johnson v. Dep’t of Lab., 165 Idaho 827, 830, 453 P.3d 261, 264 (2019) (explaining Dunlap).

[xxiv] Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 735–36, 228 P.3d 998, 1002–03 (2010).

[xxv] Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 912–13, 332 P.3d 815, 824–25 (2014).

[xxvi] See, e.g., Golub v. Kirk-Scott, Ltd., 342 P.3d 893, 899 (Idaho 2015).

[xxvii] PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2009) (emphasis added). See also Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012) (same); Jackson v. Crow, 164 Idaho 806, 811, 436 P.3d 627, 632 (2019) (same); Fisk v. McDonald, 167 Idaho 870, 892, 477 P.3d 924, 946 (2020) (same).

[xxviii] This makes sense as the case from which this mandatory language is originally drawn does not use the word “must,” but instead uses the word “should.” See Coeur d’Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990).

[xxix] Ciccarello v. Davies, 166 Idaho 153, 157–58, 456 P.3d 519, 523–24 (2019).

[xxx] Id. at 158, 456 P.3d at 524.

[xxxi] Id.

[xxxii] Id.

[xxxiii] Id. at 162, 456 P.3d at 528.

[xxxiv] Id.

[xxxv] Summerfield v. St. Luke’s McCall, Ltd., 169 Idaho 221, 234, 494 P.3d 769, 782 (2021) (cleaned up, emphasis in the original).

[xxxvi] Id.

[xxxvii] See Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc. v. Massey, 155 Idaho 942, 946, 318 P.3d 932, 936 (2014); Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 805, 291 P.3d 1000, 1004 (2012); Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 5–6, 981 P.2d 236, 240–41 (1999).

[xxxviii] BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Erstad Architects, PA, 171 Idaho 928, 528 P.3d 531, 539 (2023).

[xxxix] Id.

[xl] Id.

[xli] Id. at 543.

[xlii] I.e. prejudice caused by delay. See Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249, 92 P.3d 492, 499 (2004).

[xliii] Fisk v. McDonald, 167 Idaho 870, 892, 477 P.3d 924, 946 (2020).